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If the draftsman will beep in mind the general principle and the relatively
few pitfalls which stand in the way of a lease being deemed bona fide, it will
enable him to draft the lease so that it will be upheld by the Commission and
the courts. If the lessor is a motor carrer, he must first look to see if there has
been an order pursuant to Ex Parte MC-48. The magnitude of the investigation,
which concerns itself mainly with interchanging and augmenting equipment be-
tween contract and common earners, necessarily delays any permanent order
being formulated; still, one will be forthcoming which might well contain further
prohibitions. The guiding principle in all these lease cases is to look through the
form of the lease to see whether the lessor is in substance engaged in transporta-
tion for hire, and this includes the situation where he has control, direction and
domination of the performance of the service. However, it has been deemed al-
most without exception that leases of vehicles and drivers together and "trip-
leases" constitute the lessors contract earners. Other factors which have fre-
quently occurred in the cases and given weight in determining that the lessor was
a contract carrer are compensation computed on the amount of the cargo earned,
the lessor being responsible to the lessee for the safe delivery of the cargo and to
the public for any liability that may be incurred, and the vehicle having marks of
identification that indicate that it is owned and operated by the lessor. Still, if
these factors can be avoided and transportation by leased motor vehucles can be
arranged, it might well be the remedy so diligently sought by the shippers to
ameliorate the present transportation situation which has so burdened them
with worry.
JAMES M. MARS
THE MISDEMEANOR MANSLAUGHTER DOCTRINE UNDER
MODERN STATUTES*
There are many problems facing the prospective codifier of the law of homi-
cide. Of these, one of the most interesting is the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter. The usual common law definition of this crime is similar to that used
by a United States District Court, "Involuntary Manslaughter is where death re-
sulted unintentionally, so far as the defendant was concerned, from an unlawful
act on his part, not amounting to a felony, or from a lawful act negligently per-
formed."' The same label and punishment are attached to a homicide committed
in the perpetration of a misdemeanor ("an unlawful act not amounting to a
felony"), and to a homicide resulting from the negligent commission of a lawful
act.
This note will be concerned only with the so-called misdemeanor manslaughter
phase of the crime of involuntary manslaughter as it now exists under statutes in
the United States. A brief discussion of the common law rules of the crime will
be in order to lay a foundation for the analysis of the statutes.
Hale stated that an unintentional homicide occurring in the course of any
misdemeanor was manslaughter. He, however, suggested a limitation on this
harsh rule by making a distinction between those misdemeanors malum in se and
* This is a companion note to the one by Mr. Cromley on page .........
'U.S. v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875, 880 (C.C. W.D. Tex., 1888).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
those merely malumr prohibitun. Fundamentally, this is a difference between
misdemeanors "bad (dangerous) in themselves" and those merely prohibited by
law. A small majority of American Courts have followed this distinction and have
refused to sustain a conviction if the misdemeanor is merely malum prohibitum;
it must also be malum in se.' Another requirement that is generally recognized
is that there must be a causal relation between the misdemeanor and the homicide.'
An examination of the misdemeanor manslaughter statutes as they exist today
reveals that only about half of the states have such statutes and that they are
generally vague and unsatisfactory. Twenty-five states have statutes defining the
crime. Their general effect is to codify the common law. Any division of them
is purely mechanical and will point up differences in phraseology only. There is
little substantive variance to note. The writer considers that there are six basic
categories into which the statutes fall.
The first group is composed of five states, of which Arizona is typical:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice. It is of two kinds: Voluntary Involuntary,
in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or
in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an
unlawful manner. " (Italics, writer s)
Other states are California, Montana, New Mexico and Utah.'
It will be observed that this statute uses the common law definition of the
crime of involuntary manslaughter. The statute begins with a general definition
of the crime of manslaughter; it then points out the basic difference in that crime
and the one of murder, i.e., want of malice; it then divides manslaughter into two
component parts, voluntary and involuntary. Involuntary is further subdivided
into the misdemeanor manslaughter and the negligent manslaughter.
The basic concept of what type of criminal act will sustain a conviction under
a charge of misdemeanor manslaughter is codified by this statute, but from the
wording of the act, a conviction might well result from a crime that was less than
a misdemeanor, i.e., a civil offense. Such possibility results from the limiting
phrase, "not amounting to a felony." It will be noted that the statute does not
codify the requirement of casual relationship.
The statutes in the next group are similar to that of Illinois:
"Involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of a
human being without any intent to do so, in the commission of an
unlawful act, or a lawful act, which probably might produce such a
consequence, in an unlawful manner: Provided, always, that where
such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an un-
lawful act, which in its consequences naturally tends to destroy the
1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 475, 476 (1847). For a
discussion of what acts are usually considered to be malum in se and malum pro-
hibitum, see Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commission of an Unlawful
Act. 87 PENN. L. REv. 811, 828 (1939).
'People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W 400 (1914). See Wilner,
note 1 supra.
" Potter v. State, 162 Ind. 213, 70 N.E. 129, 64 L.R.A. 942 (1904).
3 Amiz. CODE ANN. sec. 43-2904 (1939).
0 CAL. PEN. CODE sec. 192 (Deering, 1949); 8 MONT. REv. CODE ANN. see.
94-2507 (1947); 3 N. M. STAT. ANN. sec. 41-2407 (1941); 5 UTAr CODE ANN.
sec. 103-28-5 (1943).
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life of a human bding, or is committed in the prosecution of a felon-
ious intent, the offerfse shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder."
(Italics, writer s)
Other states in the group are Colorado, Georgia, Nevada and Idaho.'
It will be immediately perceived that this statute, although not saying that
the illegal act shall be one "not amounting to a felony," as in the Arizona statute,
achieves the same result by the subsequent provision, "committed in the prosecu-
tion of a felonious intent." This statute, however, suffers a similar weakness to
that of the Arizona act. It does not specifically limit the criminal act to misde-
meanors, and civil offenses could result in a conviction. One good feature of the
statute is that it enacts the common law requirement that the act must be malum
in se.
Six states fall in the Kansas group:
"The killing of a human being without a design to effect
death, by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another,
while such other is engaged in the perpetration, or attempt to perpe-
trate any crime of misdemeanor. "' (Italics, writer s)
Others are Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wis-
consin.10
The differentiating feature of this and the previous statutes is the fact that
the word "misdemeanor" is used. This would seem to limit the crime to pure
misdemeanors. However, the effectiveness is lessened by. the introductory words
"any crime." It is submitted that although felonies are excluded, there is a pos-
sibility that civil offenses may be used to sustain a conviction. Nothing is said
about causal relationship or the requirement that the act be malum in se.
The Indiana" statute is perhaps the poorest type that exists today-
"Whoever voluntarily kills or involuntarily (kills) ti
the commission of some unlawful act, is guilty of manslaughter "
Arkansas, Nebraska, Oregon, Tennessee and Wyoming complete the group.2
All this statute says is that the act shall be "unlawful." The criminal quality
of the act is not limited. Under a literal interpretation of such a statute, both
felonies and civil offenses could be used to sustain a conviction. Such a poorly
phrased act could create a chaotic situation, and result in much injustice. Fur-
thermore, nothing is said in the statute concerning the casual relationship between
the crime and the homicide, and the malum in se concept is not specifically enacted.
ILL. REV. STAT. C. 88, sec. 863 (1949).
02 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 88, sees. 88, 36 (1985); 6 GA. CODE ANN. see. 67
(Park, 1914); 5 NEv Compx, LAws ANN. see. 10072 (1929); 4 IDAHO CODE ANN.
sec. 18-4006 (1945). The Idaho statute does not use the same phraseology, but
accomplishes the same result by using the words, "in perpetration of or attempt
to perpetrate any lawful act, other than arson, rape, robbery burglary or mayhem."9 KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. see. 21-407 (1935).
10 MIss. CODE ANN. sec. 2221 (1942); 1 N. D. REv. CODE sec. 12-2717
(1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, sec. 711 (1941); 1 S. D. CODE sec. 13.2013
(1939); Wis. STAT. sec. 340.10 (1949).
114 IND. STAT. ANN. see. 10-8405 (Burns, 1942).
1"4 ARK. STAT. ANN. see. 41-2209 (1947- 2 NEE. REv. STAT. see. 28-403
(1943); 3 ORE. Comp. LAWs ANN. sec. 28-406 (1940); 7 TENN. CODE ANN. sec.
10774 (Williams, 1934); 1 Wyo. Co-rp STAT. ANN. sec. 9-205 (1945).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The statutes of New Yorl and Minnesota,' being identical, are the most
unusual of all the statutes thus far considered. They divide the misdemeanor
manslaughter into degrees. As defined, manslaughter in the first degree consists
of those misdemeanors affecting person or property, while manslaughter in the
second degree consists of those homicides committed during the course of a tres-
pass or the invasion of a private right, not amounting to a crime. There is, of
course, a corresponding difference in punishment.
The second provision specifically enacts that thing which the writqr feels is a
failure of most of the other statutes; it allows a crime less than a misdemeanor to
sustain a conviction. It is felt that this is a very harsh rule, especially in view of
the fact that most trespasses and invasions of private rights are not tainted with
criminality. Declaring a homicide to be manslaughter if it occurs during the com-
mission of such an act has no basis in logic and is an unwise social policy.
The last group consists of one state, Lomsiana:
"Manslaughter is:
(2) A homicide committed, without any intent to cause death
or great bodily harm,
(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or at-
tempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in
Article 30, or any intentional misdemeanor directly af-
fecting the person. "i
Note that a conviction could be based upon a felony which had not been set
out in ection 30. This expands the concept of the misdemeanor manslaughter.
The crime is limited to ntentional nmsdemeanors affecting the person. This is a
serious limitation to the crime. Since this is true, the only crimes it includes are
assaults, batteries and others of a similar nature. A similar provision in New York
has been construed to be inapplicable in a case of a killing by a drunken driver."
No requrement of causal relation is set out, and the nalum n se doctrine is
omitted.
In drafting a model statute, the writer feels that the crime of involuntary
manslaughter should be carefully subdivided into a crime involving homicide
ansing out of the commission of a lawful act. It is basic that the statute should
state that the homicide was done without malice, and is unintentional. Further-
more, in order to eliminate the possibility of an improper interpretation which
might result in a miscarriage of justice, the statute must emphasize the require-
ment of a causal relation between the act and the homicide.
One of the most controversial issues at the common law was the distinction
drawn between acts nalum in se and those merely malum prohibitum. In spite
of all the criticism of this distinction, it is felt that so long as the misdemeanor
manslaughter is retained as a separate crime, there is a valid basis for the distine
tion. It appears obvious that many statutory misdemeanors are merely the whim
of the legislature and involve no element of danger. The phrases malum n se
and malum prohibitum are, however, poor words to describe the import of the
distinction. There must be a more apt phrase to incorporate the concept. Also,
3 N. Y. PEN. CoDE sees. 1050, 1052 (Thompson, 1939).
" 2 MINN. STAT. seCs. 619.15, 619.18 (1945).
" LA. CODE CRIM. LA-w & Paoc. ANN. art. 740-81 (Hart, 1943).
"People v. Grieco, 266 N. Y. 48, 193 N.E. 634 (1934).
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the statute, as a whole, must be stated in positive language to assure a standard
interpreptation by the courts.
The following model statute is submitted as effecting the ideas found in the
above paragraph:
"Manslaughter:
I. Voluntary -
IL Involuntary - Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional,
unlawful killing of a human being. It is of two kinds:
(1) In the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any common
law or statutory misdemeanor which endangers human life
and safety. The homicide must be the proximate result
of the commission of, or attempt to commit, the misde-
meanor.
(2) In the commission of any lawful act in a criminally negli-
gent manner."
It will be noted that the ultimate test for conviction under subsection (1) and sub-
section (2) is the same, although stated in a different manner. Liability is based
upon the amount of danger in the act under sub-section (1), while negligence is
the basis of liability in sub-section (2). Negligence, however, is deterrmned by
the foreseeability of danger. Thus a conviction of involuntary manslaughter may
only be obtained by showing a dangerous act. Any conviction that could be ob-
tained under sub-section (1) could also be obtained under sub-section (2). It
follows that it might be well to eliminate the misdemeanor manslaughter and to
base the conviction of involuntary manslaughter solely upon negligence.
ROBERT F STEPHENS
MISDEMEANOR MANSLAUGHTER UNDER STATE STATUTES*
Today, in the absence of statute, it is involuntary manslaughter where one
unintentionally kills another in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting
to a felony.' This is usually referred to as the misdemeanor, manslaughter doctrine.
Under this rule the killing is done without any design, intention or purpose of
killing, but in the commission of some unlawful nonfelomous act.
This rule is the basis for the "misdemeanor manslaughter" statutes which
have been adopted by twenty-five states. Before examining these statutes, it is
essential that the common law be closely observed. The mental state which
characterizes the crime of involuntary manslaughter is the absence of intention
to cause death. In determining whether a culpable homicide was committed by
a person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor, it is not necessary
to conclude that he shall have intended to violate the law, although he must have
had an intent to commit the act. The unlawful act, however, must be dangerous
in itself or in marked disregard of the safety of others. A mere thoughtless
omission or slight deviation from the norm of reasonable conduct will not suffice.
The state of mind of the person while committing the act is not controlling. Fur-
* This is a companion note to the one by Mr. Stephens on page .........
'Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commission of an Unlawful Act, 87
PA. L. BEv. 811 (1939).2 See, Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 93 S.W 646 (1906).
